Online Learning of Aggregate Knowledge about Non-linear Preferences Applied to Negotiating Prices and Bundles

In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a procedure for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach lies in combining aggregate (anonymous) knowledge of customer preferences with current data about the ongoing negotiation process. The developed procedure either works with already obtained aggregate knowledge or, in the absence of such knowledge, learns the relevant information online. We conduct computer experiments with simulated customers that have_nonlinear_ preferences. We show how, for various types of customers, with distinct negotiation heuristics, our procedure (with and without the necessary aggregate knowledge) increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and the Pareto efficiency of the deals reached compared to a benchmark.Comment: 10 pages, 5 eps figures, ACM Proceedings documentclass, Published in "Proc. 6th Int'l Conf. on Electronic Commerce ICEC04, Delft, The Netherlands," M. Janssen, H. Sol, R. Wagenaar (eds.). ACM Pres

Negotiating over Bundles and Prices Using Aggregate Knowledge

Combining two or more items and selling them as one good, a practice called bundling, can be a very effective strategy for reducing the costs of producing, marketing, and selling goods. In this paper, we consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some key insights about, as well as a technique for, locating mutually beneficial alternatives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach lies in combining historical sales data, condensed into aggregate knowledge, with current data about the ongoing negotiation process, to exploit these insights. In particular, when negotiating a given bundle of goods with a customer, the shop analyzes the sequence of the customer's offers to determine the progress in the negotiation process. In addition, it uses aggregate knowledge concerning customers' valuations of goods in general. We show how the shop can use these two sources of data to locate promising alternatives to the current bundle. When the current negotiation's progress slows down, the shop may suggest the most promising of those alternatives and, depending on the customer's response, continue negotiating about the alternative bundle, or propose another alternative. Extensive computer simulation experiments show that our approach increases the speed with which deals are reached, as well as the number and quality of the deals reached, as compared to a benchmark. In addition, we show that the performance of our system is robust to a variety of changes in the negotiation strategies employed by the customers.Comment: 15 pages, 7 eps figures, Springer llncs documentclass. Extended version of the paper published in "E-Commerce and Web Technologies," Kurt Bauknecht, Martin Bichler and Birgit Pr\"{o}ll (eds.). Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3182, Berlin: Springer, p. 218--22

Fairness in smart grid congestion management

With the energy transition, grid congestion is increasingly becoming a problem. This paper proposes the implementation of fairness in congestion management by presenting quantitative fair optimization goals and fairness measuring tools. Furthermore, this paper presents a congestion management solution in the form of an egalitarian allocation mechanism. Finally, this paper proves that this mechanism is truthful, pareto efficient, and maximizes a fair optimization goal

Bundling and pricing for information brokerage: customer satisfaction as a means to profit optimization

Traditionally, the study of on-line dynamic pricing and bundling strategies for information goods is motivated by the value-extracting or profit-generating potential of these strategies. In this paper we discuss the relatively overlooked potential of these strategies to on-line learn more about customers' preferences. Based on this enhanced customer knowledge an information broker can-- by tailoring the brokerage services more to the demand of the various customer groups-- persuade customers to engage in repeated transactions (i.e., generate customer lock-in). To illustrate the discussion, we show by means of a basic consumer model how, with the use of on-line dynamic bundling and pricing algorithms, customer lock-in can occur. The lock-in occurs because the algorithms can both find appropriate prices and (from the customers' perspective) the most interesting bundles. In the conducted computer experiments we use an advanced genetic algorithm with a niching method to learn the most interesting bundles efficiently and effectively

Dynamic routing problems with fruitful regions: models and evolutionary computation

We introduce the concept of fruitful regions in a dynamic routing context: regions that have a high potential of generating loads to be transported. The objective is to maximise the number of loads transported, while keeping to capacity and time constraints. Loads arrive while the problem is being solved, which makes it a real-time routing problem. The solver is a self-adaptive evolutionary algorithm that ensures feasible solutions at all times. We investigate under what conditions the exploration of fruitful regions improves the effectiveness of the evolutionary algorith

Co-evolving automata negotiate with a variety of opponents

Real-life negotiations typically involve multiple parties with different preferences for the different issues and bargaining strategies which change over time. Such a dynamic environment (with imperfect information) is addressed in this paper with a multi-population evolutionary algorithm (EA). Each population represents an evolving collection of bargaining strategies in our setup. The bargaining strategies are represented by a special kind of finite automata, which require only two transitions per state. We show that such automata (with a limited complexity) are a suitable choice in a computational setting. We furthermore describe an EA which generates highly-efficient bargaining automata in the course of time. A series of computational experiments shows that co-evolving automata are able to discriminate successfully between different opponents, although they receive no explicit information about the identity or preferences of their opponents. These results are important for the further development of evolving automata for real-life (agent system) applications